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OVER THE COUNTER PLAN B AND DECISIONAL AUTONOMY FOR ADOLESCENTS
Jared Pickell

INTRODUCTION
College students at Shippensburg University can get Plan B emergency contraception
from a vending machine for $25.1 New York City public schools distributed free Plan B to 567
high school students, without parental consent, during the 2011-2012 school year.2 About one
out of five pharmacies illegally denies emergency contraception to seventeen-year-old girls.3 An
Indiana United States Senate candidate recently said he opposed abortion and emergency
contraception “even when life begins in that horrible situation of rape, that it is something God
intended to happen.”4 Wheaton College, an evangelical Christian liberal arts school in Illinois,
requested an injunction against Obamacare’s emergency contraception insurance coverage, only
to find out that the school itself had been inadvertently covering Plan B long before Obamacare
went into effect.5

1

Associated Press, Morning-After Pills in Vending Machine, POLITICO, Feb. 7, 2012,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72592.html.
2
Ahemona Hartocollis, More Access to Contraceptives in City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/nyregion/resistance-low-to-school-contraceptives-effort-new-york-healthofficials-say.html. This was part of a pilot program for increasing the use and availability of contraceptives for high
risk students who may not have easy access to healthcare regarding these matters. While parental consent is not
necessary, the program does have a parental “opt out” feature. Only 1-2 % of parents chose to opt out.
3
Maia Szalavitz, Plan B: 1 in 5 Pharmacists May Deny Eligible Teens Access to Emergency Contraception, TIME,
Mar. 26, 2012, http://healthland.time.com/2012/03/26/plan-b-1-in-5-pharmacists-may-deny-eligible-teens-access-toemergency-contraception/.
4
Louise Radnofsky, Indiana GOP Candidate Sparks New Fight Over Abortion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203937004578077122446378616.html (the candidate is Richard
Mourdock).
5
Laura Bassett, Wheaton College “Inadvertently” Covered Emergency Contraception Before Birth Control
Mandate, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/wheaton-college-birthcontrol_n_1734919.html.

The heavily politicized stories above help frame the debate over whether emergency
contraception, namely, Plan B,6 should be available over the counter (OTC) to young women
under the age of seventeen. This debate seems to be largely political, and it incites strong,
sometimes visceral, reactions. There is no shortage of literature scolding the FDA and the
Department of Health and Human Services7 and their officers for allowing political, and perhaps
religious, inclinations to “win the day” in place of scientific and medical research. Scholars have
also written extensively on First Amendment privacy issues and procreation decisions as a
fundamental right, and how the legacy of Griswold,8 Roe,9 and Casey10 “obviously” mandates
that all women should have access to OTC emergency contraception. The political bickering and
the circularity of constitutional jurisprudence concerning Plan B and similar procreation issues
obfuscates the importance of decisional autonomy for individuals, their medical care, and their
bodily integrity.
This article checks the messy politics and the nebulous constitutional debates at the door
and focuses on the decisional capacity of adolescent women to decide for themselves whether to
use OTC Plan B. From the principle of individual autonomy, especially when it comes to
making medical decisions, this article’s central thesis is that most adolescent women possess the
cognitive and decision-making skills necessary to decide whether to use contraception,
specifically, Plan B, free from red tape. This piece will use various law review articles, articles
from medical, sociological, and psychological journals, as well as caselaw and examples by way
Plan B is “a backup plan that helps prevent pregnancy after unprotected sex or birth control failure.” PLAN B ONESTEP, “What Plan B One-Step Is,” available at http://www.planbonestep.com/what-is-plan-b.aspx.
7
See infra, Part I.
8
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1966) (holding that the Constitution contains a right to privacy, and that
the Connecticut law banning contraceptives violated this right and was therefore unconstitutional).
9
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy found in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment extended to a woman’s decision to have an abortion, balanced by the state’s interest in both
protecting the fetus and protecting the woman’s health).
10
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirmed a woman’s right to
have an abortion).
6
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of comparison. From these sources, this piece argues that Plan B, approved for OTC use by
seventeen-year-old women, should also be approved for OTC use by all adolescent women of
reproductive age who possess the cognitive ability to make the autonomous decision to take Plan
B.
Part I will provide background to the development of the OTC status of Plan B, its
efficacy as a method of contraception, and the consensus of the medical community as to its
safety, while emphasizing Plan B as a method of contraception and not an abortifacient.11 Part II
will set up the article’s general framework and approach—the value of individual autonomy in
making medical decisions—and highlight literature exploring adolescents’ cognitive and
emotional ability to make medical decisions, and other important decisions, generally. Part III
will apply the framework of Part II to the debate over OTC Plan B for adolescent women.
Part IV will offer a solution to the debate regarding OTC Plan B for adolescent women—
these women should decide whether to take Plan B for themselves because their decision-making
faculties and the literature on Plan B’s safety dictate that their decisional autonomy should be
respected above all other considerations. It will highlight similar age-based regulations and
restrictions (or lack thereof), and examine their justifications, offering a pause point for
comparison with the OTC Plan B issue. These comparative examples include various types of
tobacco regulation, and laws presuming that minors lack the capacity to make contracts. Part IV
will also use its conclusions regarding the Plan B debate to offer broader instruction—in our
policy-making and legislation we must defer more to the medical community and to the
decisional autonomy of the individual to make medical decisions. And for medication and
treatment approved for OTC use, this decisional autonomy should always extend to adolescents.

Plan B “should not affect or terminate an existing pregnancy.” PLAN B ONE-STEP, “What Plan B One-Step Is,”
available at http://www.planbonestep.com/what-is-plan-b.aspx.
11
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I. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN B AND ITS OTC STATUS
In 1999, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of the synthetic
hormone levonorgestrel12 as a prescription-only emergency contraceptive that would be sold as
Plan B.13 Plan B originally consisted of two tablets—the first pill should be ingested within
seventy-two hours of unprotected sex, and the second pill twelve hours later.14 If taken properly,
Plan B can prevent approximately 89 percent of unwanted pregnancies.15 It is important to
remember that Plan B is not an abortion pill;16 Plan B works to prevent fertilization,17 or if
fertilization does occur, to prevent implantation.18 When taken as directed, Plan B is safe19 and
its “side effects are generally mild,” with some women experiencing “side effects similar to
many birth control pills.”20 These side effects include heavier or lighter periods, nausea, lower
abdominal pain, fatigue, headaches, dizziness, and breast tenderness.21
Soon after, the lack of practicality of getting a prescription filled for a treatment that is
only viable for less than seventy-two hours after unprotected sex became apparent.22 The fact
that unprotected sex can often be a traumatic experience complicates the matter further.23 Due to
the exigency of taking Plan B within seventy-two hours after unprotected sex, and the difficulties
Levonorgestrel is “a synthetic progestogen (any progestational steroid, such as progesterone) that is used as a
form of contraception in women.” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, “Levonorgestrel,” available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/338040/levonorgestrel.
13
Barbara Chevalier, The Constitutionality of the FDA’s Age-Based Plan B Regulations: Why the FDA Made the
Wrong Decision, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 238 (2007).
14
Id. at 239.
15
Sydney Kokjohn, The Imposition of an Age Restriction on Over-the-Counter Access to Plan B Emergency
Contraception: Violating Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Exceeding Statutory Authority, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 369, 372 (2008).
16
There is an abortion pill, mifepristone, commonly known as RU-486. It has been available by prescription in the
United States, but it is different from Plan B. Chevalier, supra note 13, at 240.
17
Fertilization is the union of sperm and egg.
18
Implantation is when the fertilized egg, or embryo, attaches to the uterus.
19
The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) ensures that drugs, before their approval for the
market, “work correctly and that their health benefits outweigh their known risks.” FDA, “Development &
Approval Process (Drugs),” available at http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm.
20
PLAN B ONE-STEP, “FAQs,” available at http://www.planbonestep.com/plan-b-faq.aspx.
21
Id.
22
Kokjohn, supra note 15, at 374.
23
Id.
12
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of getting a prescription filled under those circumstances, Plan B’s manufacturer filed an OTC
petition with the FDA in 2003.24 This type of petition is known as an “over-the-counter switch”
and is the method through which the FDA allows drugs to be sold without a prescription.25 Plan
B’s manufacturer revised its petition in 2004 after the FDA told it that there was not enough data
to prove that adolescents fifteen and younger could use Plan B safely without a doctor’s
oversight.26 This revised petition requested that only women age sixteen and older have access
to OTC Plan B.27 After numerous delays by the FDA,28 and serious political involvement,29 on
August 23, 2006 the FDA approved OTC use of Plan B, but only for women over the age of
eighteen.30 To enforce the ban on the sale of OTC Plan B for adolescents under eighteen, the
FDA required that only pharmacies or other facilities with a healthcare professional sell Plan B.31
The FDA also required that Plan B be kept behind the counter, and that women seeking to
purchase it present proof of age.32
In 2009, the FDA approved the sale of Plan B One-Step,33 a one-pill version of the
emergency contraception, to seventeen-year-olds without a prescription.34 But this was only

24

Rob Stein, Obama Administration Refuses to Relax Plan B Restrictions, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-refuses-to-relax-plan-brestrictions/2011/12/07/gIQAF5HicO_story.html.
25
21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b). Before an OTC switch takes place, the drug must meet certain FDA criteria. These
include: (1) an acceptable safety profile based on prescription use and experience; (2) a low potential for abuse; (3)
an appropriate safety and therapeutic index; (4) a positive benefit-to-risk assessment; and (5) it is needed for a
condition that is self-recognizable, self-limiting, and requires minimal intervention by a healthcare practitioner for
treatment. Id.
26
Kokjohn, supra note 15, at 375.
27
Id. at 376.
28
For example, the FDA missed its statutory deadline for ruling on the application. Id.
29
For example, then Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton promised to “prevent the Senate from voting on Lester
Crawford’s nomination to be the new Commissioner of the FDA until the agency ruled on Plan B’s pending
application.” Id.
30
Id. at 377.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
The FDA approved the safety and use of Plan B One-Step on July 13, 2009. See Drug Information Online, FDA
Approves Plan B One-Step, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.drugs.com/newdrugs/fda-approves-plan-b-onestep-new-one-pill-emergency-contraceptive-1486.html.

4

after a federal judge ruled35 on the issue, holding that “the agency’s 2006 decision to limit
availability of the controversial contraception to women 18 and older was invalid and politically
motivated.”36 While this paper is not concerned with the political and religious undertones of the
debate over OTC Plan B, these considerations cannot be ignored because they drove the next
stage in the history of OTC Plan B. This stage saw results that seemed to disregard scientific
evidence and to trump politics over considered advice from the medical community.
The political and implicit religious inclinations regarding whether Plan B should be
available OTC to all females came to a head in 2011.37 At this time, the FDA was ready to
approve OTC access to Plan B for women and girls of all ages.38 In a lengthy statement, FDA
Commissioner Dr. Margaret Hamburg wrote that the agencies’ scientists “determined that the
product [Plan B] was safe and effective in adolescent females, that adolescent females
understood that the product was not for routine use, and that the product would not protect them
against sexually transmitted disease.”39 But flouting the scientific evidence, and with no
precedent on the books,40 the Department of Health and Human Services secretary, Kathleen
Sebelius, publicly overruled the FDA’s decision.41 Secretary Sebelius based her decision on

34

Rob Stein, 17-Year-Olds Gain Access to Plan B Pill, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/22/AR2009042202248.html.
35
Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Indeed, the record is clear that the FDA’s course
of conduct regarding Plan B departed in significant ways from the agency’s normal procedures regarding similar
applications to switch a drug product from prescription to non-prescription use, referred to as a ‘switch application’
or an ‘over-the-counter switch.”).
36
Stein, supra note 34.
37
See, e.g., Editorial, Politics and the Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/opinion/politics-and-the-morning-afterpill.html?ref=policy&gwh=95631044E0EFEE5D87DD57F1A07DC42C (This editorial states that “once again, the
politics of birth control have trumped science and sound public policy,” while mentioning that “social and religious
conservatives have lobbied for years to restrict access to the pill”);
38
Gardiner Harris, Plan to Widen Availability of Morning-After Pill is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/health/policy/sebelius-overrules-fda-on-freer-sale-of-emergencycontraceptives.html?_r=0&gwh=EB01D02592AC9885A36D38052B5F33BB.
39
Id.
40
Though it is legal for the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to overrule the FDA.
41
Id.
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insufficient data: “the data provided as part of the actual use study and the label comprehension
study are not sufficient to support making Plan B One-Step available to all girls 16 and younger,
without talking to a health care professional.”42
Interestingly, for purposes of this piece, Secretary Sebelius, in noting that approximately
ten percent of girls at age eleven can become pregnant, mentioned that “there are significant
cognitive and behavioral differences between older adolescent girls and the youngest girls of
reproductive age.”43 Perhaps, then, whether or not to place an “age floor” for OTC Plan B, when
taking into account cognitive decisional capacity, is a legitimate scientific question. This piece
will now explore scientific sources regarding an adolescent’s cognitive ability to make medical
decisions, and the extent to which this cognitive ability should grant such an adolescent the
power to make autonomous healthcare decisions.
II. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY, MEDICAL DECISIONS, AND ADOLESCENTS’ COGNITIVE ABILITY
Respect for autonomy is “a central value in Western medicine and medical ethics.”44 But
pinning down an exact definition of this concept, in any context, is difficult. Various distinctions
of terminology exist, including moral autonomy,45 personal autonomy,46 and basic autonomy.47
Conceptual and philosophical distinctions abound, and are, as expected, extremely complex and
subject to scholarly debate. This piece, however, focuses on a distinct version of autonomy:
autonomy in the bioethical sense, utilized in making personal healthcare decisions. And it is this
42

Department of Health & Human Services, Statement by Kathleen Sebelius, Dec. 7, 2011, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/12/20111207a.html.
43
Id.
44
Jukka Varelius, The Value of Autonomy in Medical Ethics, 9 MED. HEALTH CARE PHILOS. 3, 3 (2006).
45
Moral autonomy, in the Kantian sense, is “the capacity to impose the (objective) moral law on oneself, and . . . is
claimed as a fundamental organizing principle of all morality.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Autonomy in
Moral and Political Philosophy,” available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/#AutRelationalAut.
46
Personal autonomy “celebrates creative self-authorship and encourages the development of those virtues (such
as integrity and authenticity) that support it.” Robert S. Taylor, Kantian Personal Autonomy, 33 POL. THEORY 5,
602 (2005).
47
Basic autonomy is “the minimal status of being responsible, independent and able to speak for oneself.” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy,” available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/#AutRelationalAut.
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sense of autonomy through which this piece analyzes the degree to which adolescents should be
responsible for their healthcare decisions, specifically, whether to use Plan B.
Decisional autonomy in the healthcare realm—a complex and even philosophical issue—
“is predicated on decision-making capacity.”48 In bioethical discourse, autonomy is the principle
out of which grew the doctrine of informed consent, which, generally, is the process “by which a
fully informed patient can participate in choices about her health care.”49 People should have a
say in decisions about their medical care, and as rational actors, must be properly informed by
their physicians to make such decisions.50 From a philosophical perspective, we justify the
principle of decisional autonomy in medical decisions—and define decision-making capacity—
using different subsets of perhaps elusive variables. For example, one scholar has said such
variables include “an ability to understand information, to deliberate about it, and to
communicate a choice with clarity.”51
Bioethics scholars trying to provide clarity to the doctrine of informed consent have
borrowed language from the law’s attempt to define “consent.”52 This includes an individual’s
ability to give “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” consent.53 While perhaps never definitive,
legal and bioethical scholars have tried to pin down definitions of these modifiers. For example,
one bioethics scholar has defined “voluntary” as a patient’s ability “to provide consent that is not

48

Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician Perceptions and Practices,
8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 87, 87 (2001).
49
Univ. Washington School of Medicine, “Ethics in Medicine: Informed Consent,” available at
http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/consent.html.
50
Id.
51
Hartman, supra note 48, at 87.
52
See Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: a Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 3 (1978).
53
See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences”).
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merely an acquiescent or deferent response to authority.”54 She defined “knowing” as “the
match between the information given to the patient and the patient’s own paraphrase of that
information,” and “intelligent” as “the competence of the patient to arrive at the consent decision
rationally, not upon others’ opinions concerning the advisability of the patient’s decision
itself.”55 Informed consent, then, “is a primary means of respecting the autonomy of patients
because one cannot act autonomously when denied access to information that is pertinent to the
decision at hand.”56
The law incorporates bioethical ideas of autonomy, informed consent, and decisional
capacity in its decree that adults,57 but not adolescents,58 are presumed capable of making their
own healthcare decisions.59 Thus, the law presumes that adolescents are not capable of making
their own medical decisions. This presumption is subject to numerous exceptions, including
medical care for emergencies, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, drug or alcohol
dependency, mental health treatment, and abortion.60 These exceptions are grounded in both
practical and ethical concerns.61 The practical concerns include the public health goals of
preventing the spread of disease, preventing drug abuse, and allowing access to stigmatized
treatments for which adolescents might fear telling their parents.62 The ethical concerns
highlight the value and benefit that autonomous decision-making brings to individuals.63
Anomalously, the law presumes that adolescents do not possess the cognitive and emotional

54

Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body is it Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights
for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 284–85 (2005).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 294.
57
Those individuals eighteen years of age—the age of majority—and older.
58
Generally those ranging from age fourteen to seventeen.
59
Hartman, supra note 48, at 88.
60
Id. at 90.
61
See Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 270.
62
Id. at 270–72.
63
Id. at 272–78.
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maturity to make their own health care decisions—unless the healthcare decisions are for “adult
problems.”64
The presumption that adolescents are incapable of making healthcare decisions derived
from late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century notions of society that have not kept pace with
developmental psychology.65 In fact, vast quantities of medical research suggest that adolescents
are capable of making autonomous healthcare decisions, at the very least beyond the level
presently presumed by law.66 One study found “little evidence that minors of age fifteen and
above as a group are any less competent to provide consent [for medical decisions] than are
adults.”67 Another study showed that as early as age fourteen, minors are as competent as adults
to make autonomous healthcare decisions.68 A study on decision-making during pregnancy
found that fourteen through seventeen year olds were similar to adults in cognitive ability and
volition, and “remain competent decision makers when facing an emotionally challenging real
world decision.”69 In our society—which puts a high value on autonomy and individual
freedoms—if an adolescent possesses the same level of cognitive ability as an adult, then it

64

For example, a seventeen-year-old can seek STD treatment without parental consent, but would need parental
consent to treat a complication arising from the STD treatment. Even more incongruous are the following examples:
“a teenage mother must give consent before her baby may be treated, but, by and large, is not permitted to consent to
her own health care. An adolescent boy can be tested and treated for HIV without parental involvement, but his
parents must consent to setting his broken leg.” Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 127, 127 (1996).
65
See Hartman, supra note 48, at 90; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (“Deeply rooted in our
Nation’s history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over
one’s children.”).
66
Id. at 96.
67
Grisso & Vierling, supra note 52, at 423.
68
Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 53 Child Dev. 1589, 1595 (1982). “The age of 18 or 21 as the ‘cutoffs’ below which
individuals are presumed to be incompetent to make determinations about their own welfare do not reflect
psychological capacities of most adolescents.” Id. at 1595–96.
69
Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological and Legal Competence
to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 147 (1992).
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logically follows that she “should play a significant role in determining the course of her medical
treatment.”70
Courts have used two main justifications regarding the presumption that adolescents are
incapable of making autonomous medical decisions: “(1) adolescents are not capable of making
important life decisions; and (2) courts assume that parents, after being informed by the
physicians, will make decisions in the best interests of the child.”71 The above discussion
regarding developmental psychology dispels the first justification.72 As for the second
justification, while (we hope) most parents will make medical and other decisions in the best
interests of their children, for a variety of reasons,73 not all do.74 Cases of child abuse aside, “for
some parents, despite best intentions and grave concern, their instincts may not always serve the
best interests of a child.”75 This evidence calls for a reexamination of the assumptions
underlying the jurisprudence of adolescents and their capacity as autonomous decision-makers.
Presumptive decisional incapacity for adolescents contravenes social norms and trends in
other areas—these include juvenile delinquency and family court, “where adolescents are
afforded decisional autonomy and accompanying accountability.”76 In family law, the older a
child gets, the more say he or she has in matters concerning, for example, custody, visitation
rights, and adoption.77 Tort law provides no immunity based solely upon the age of an accused
tortfeasor; rather, the tort duty is phrased in language like “how a reasonable fourteen year old

70

Anthony W. Austin, Medical Decisions and Children: How Much Voice Should Children Have in their Medical
Care?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 149 (2007).
71
Id. at 151–52.
72
See text accompanying notes 22–27.
73
For example, some parents might physically and emotionally abuse their children, and then refuse to seek
treatment for their children to avoid legal and criminal ramifications.
74
See Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 282.
75
Id. For example, a parent might attempt to prevent his child from receiving a life-saving blood transfusion for
religious reasons.
76
Hartman, supra note 48, at 89.
77
Id.
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(or fifteen or sixteen year old, etc.) would act in a given situation.”78 These examples show the
exception to the rule: as children develop cognitively and gradually attain decisional maturity,
they become increasingly able to become more involved in making autonomous decisions and
otherwise participating in society in general. But “in choosing the chronological age marker of
eighteen, the law denies rights to fourteen to seventeen-year-old adolescents who are generally
capable of exercising such rights in a thoughtful fashion.”79
Given the increasing cognitive ability and competency of adolescents with each
successive year, the purported presumptions do not represent reality with respect to
adolescents.80 Adolescents approach medical decisions “with a quality of intentionality that is
not seen in the decisions made by children,”81 which suggests that recognizing adolescent
autonomous decision-making for healthcare “may improve their response to treatment and
encourage the development of self-efficacy.”82 While a few states have recognized the “mature
minor”83 doctrine, and in the abortion context the Supreme Court allows for “judicial bypass”84
of the parents’ wishes, the law does not contain the requisite flexibility to deal with adolescent
decision-making.
The proposed autonomy analysis of this piece requires one to “‘reject the formulation that
the adolescent is being protected [and i]nstead . . . view the [traditional] insistence on parental

78

Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 290.
Id. at 254.
80
See Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2012).
81
David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 431, 446 (1991).
82
Id.
83
The “mature minor” doctrine “allows minors who can understand the nature and consequences of the medical
treatment being offered the legal power to consent or refuse treatment in situations in which parental consent would
be difficult to obtain or would cause family conflict.” Austin, supra note 70, at 159.
84
See Baird 443 U.S., at 643–44 (holding that a minor who wished to avoid parental-consent requirements for
abortion must be given the opportunity to bypass the requirement by proving to a judge that either she is mature
enough to make the abortion decision on her own, or that abortion would be in her best interests).
79
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consent as a denial of the adolescent’s rights as a person, separate from his parents.”85 For those
who believe that it is sacrilege to put autonomous medical decisions in the hands of minors, all
autonomous actors, adults and children alike, do not always act rationally, or with compassion,
or according to everyone’s competing ideals. In the words of one scholar:
it is false to suggest that young people lack autonomy because they may make
decisions that appear irrational, cruel, or otherwise deficient. Autonomy need not
rest on an assessment of the decision that might have been made by another, but
instead is premised upon the process by which an actor reaches a decision.86
Thus, when the cognitive ability of an adolescent enables her to reach decisions based on a
similar process to that of adults, she should be able to make autonomous medical decisions. This
does not mean that the adolescent should not have input from her parents or other concerned
individuals; dependence and an autonomous existence are not mutually exclusive.87 For “in the
continuous development of the relative-adult out of the relative-child there is no point before
which the child himself has no part in his own shaping, and after which he is the sole responsible
maker of his own character and life plan.”88
Thus, this article puts forth the following framework: once reaching the age of fourteen,
the adolescent, based on her maturity and cognitive development, should be allowed to make
certain autonomous healthcare decisions. As the adolescent reaches the age of seventeen she
should be given more autonomy to make such decisions, again, qualified by her developmental
ability to make such decisions. To the extent that the maturity level of an adolescent would
preclude her from making a completely autonomous medical decision, the parent should decide,
with the adolescent having substantial input. Healthcare providers and courts should take this

85

Thomas J. Silber, Ethical Considerations in Caring for Adolescents, 10 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 408, 409 (1981).
Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 277.
87
Id. at 273.
88
Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy,” THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 27, 34 (John Christman,
ed. 1989).
86
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input seriously, in the same vein as the family law context mentioned above. And the law should
apply this framework for all medical decisions, including the OTC Plan B controversy.
III. WHY THE INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ADOLESCENTS’
DECISIONS REGARDING OTC PLAN B
This article has advocated for the principal of autonomy in medical decision-making.89
When feasible, we should put the ball in the patient’s court to make her own medical decisions,
based on sound medical advice as well as advice from friends and family. This framework faces
the least resistance when a fully capable adult makes the healthcare decision—indeed the law
presumes that adults over the age of majority have decisional capacity.90 But when an
adolescent, under the age of eighteen, is faced with the same medical decision, the law and
society in general push back.91 In many cases, the law presumes that adolescents do not possess
the cognitive and emotional maturity to make their own health care decisions.92 And the
societal opposition is especially acute when the medical decision involves reproductive rights93
and reproductive health.94 This piece will now argue for the application of the cognitive
development framework set out in Part II to OTC Plan B specifically, and then advocate the use
of that approach to solve the Plan B debates.
A recent New York City pilot program95 that provides high school students with Plan B
and other contraceptives without parental consent has received considerable media attention.96
Interestingly, the pilot program appears to have received very little resistance from the parents of
89
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the adolescents receiving the contraceptives.97 In the 2011-2012 school year, 567 young women
received Plan B emergency contraception from the program, while only 1-2 percent of parents
chose the “opt-out option,” which would prevent their children from receiving any
contraceptives through the program.98 Given the 180-day school year, that means that an
average of 3.15 Plan B regiments were distributed to high school students daily.
Presumably a large number of the adolescents receiving Plan B through the New York
City public high school pilot program are under age 17, and thus circumvent the current
requirement that girls under 17 get a prescription before they can receive Plan B.99 But, as
mentioned above, the parents of these adolescents amendable to the program did not opt out.100
Thus, in certain areas of New York City, a vast majority of parents implicitly believe that their
adolescent daughters can make the decision whether to use Plan B on their own. Even assuming
that New York is more progressive toward reproductive rights generally, and might be a
potential outlier from a national perspective, a key distinction to keep in mind is that the parents
allowed their children to make their own decision regarding Plan B.101
Perhaps then, in the event that other localities enact programs similar to that in New
York, the resistance that some people would feel toward such a program would be based on an
aversion toward birth control, Plan B, or abortion generally, and would have nothing to do with
questions of decisional autonomy and cognitive development in adolescents.102 Also, the
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aversion potentially would have nothing to do with scientific research and sound medicine. As
mentioned above, the FDA “determined that the product [Plan B] was safe and effective in
adolescent females, [and] that adolescent females understood that the product was not for routine
use.”103 Secretary Sebelius and the Department of Health & Human Services, however,
disagreed with the FDA and overruled the FDA’s decision to approve OTC Plan B for all
ages.104 Sebelius based this decision on her finding that there was insufficient data to support
OTC Plan B for adolescents under seventeen.105
The disagreement here between the FDA and the Department of Health & Human
Services has been criticized as largely, if not completely, political.106 Also, the way the
disagreement has played out among the citizenry is not only political, but often ignores valid
scientific and medical research, and neglects to take into account decisional capacity with a
processed-based approach.107 In the context of medicine, political inclinations should take a
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backseat because medicine, at its core, is not a political question, but a scientific one.108 Too
much political bickering on issues that people hold close to heart not only prevents peaceable
solutions, but also potentially stalls novel approaches to resolve such disputes. The vitriol
between the two camps109 regarding the right to an abortion, for example, is still going strong
despite the fact that the Supreme Court definitively ruled to give women such a right almost forty
years ago.110 Rather than facilitate the implementation of the law, or perhaps more
constructively, to figure out ways to help prevent the need for an abortion, many are content to
advocate abolishing the right to an abortion.111 This is extremely unlikely to happen, in large
part because the scientific community has essentially come to a consensus on the safety of
regulated abortions.112
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Although debates continue to rage over reproductive health and reproductive rights,
people usually do not take issue with drugs that become available OTC.113 For example,
ibuprofen, originally a prescription-only NSAID,114 was approved by the FDA for OTC use, as
Advil, in 1984.115 Today people take Advil to help relieve pain and headaches without much
thought.116 People feel the pain, want to alleviate it, know Advil works to do so, and then ingest
the Advil if they decide it is a proper course of action given the circumstances—adults and
children age 12 and over are directed to take the same dose and are susceptible to the same side
effects.117 And people throughout the world have Advil in medicine cabinets.118 It would not be
remiss to claim that once medical treatment is deemed safe, then society generally believes that
people should be able to decide for themselves whether to use such a treatment.
Most people will concede that one may decide for herself whether to take an Advil,
safeguarded by the fact that the FDA approved that drug for OTC use—an approval process that
requires a rigorous scientific process.119 Further, but for Secretary Sebelius’s political rejection
of the FDA’s recommendation, Plan B would be available to all adolescent women OTC based
on sound scientific evidence.120 Yet, even though those FDA safeguards are present in the Plan
B “OTC switch,” large swaths of American society might cringe at the idea of a minor deciding
for herself whether to use Plan B. And it is this “cringing,” and its accompanying backlash, that
113
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call for the application of the decisional autonomy framework from Part II to the OTC Plan B
controversy.
Decisional autonomy on personal and sensitive healthcare decisions like abortion and
Plan B, which have been sanctioned by medical science, should be the fundamental principle
grounding any policy discussions thereon. Once a treatment is deemed safe, the person seeking
such treatment should be able to decide for herself whether to take advantage of such a
treatment, regardless of her age. If a woman’s personal values caution her against the use of
Plan B, and she elects not to use Plan B in a relevant situation, then decisional autonomy has
won the day, and the integrity of that individual remains intact. But when that same woman
cannot decide on her own—either because someone forced her to take Plan B or because
someone prevented her from taking Plan B—then the woman has lost the ability to control her
own life, and perhaps has lost a bit of herself. For these reasons, and for those discussed in Part
II and in this part, above, adolescents who possess the cognitive ability to make healthcare
decisions should decide for themselves whether to use Plan B. This application of the principle
of autonomy in medical decision-making calls for Plan B to be available to all decisionally
capable adolescents, regardless of age. The next section of this piece will use the
aforementioned framework to put forth a solution to the OTC Plan B debate, and will open up its
analysis to include a broader policy discussion.
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE DEBATE REGARDING OTC PLAN B FOR ADOLESCENT WOMEN
This article has argued that Plan B, approved for OTC use by seventeen-year-old women,
should also be approved for OTC use by all adolescent women who possess the cognitive ability
to make autonomous decisions. In the case of Plan B, the scientific and medical research shows
two crucial factors: (1) Plan B is safe; and (2) adolescents younger than seventeen understand
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and appreciate the decision-making process to take Plan B.121 After balancing public health
against individual liberty, and because their decision-making faculties and the literature on Plan
B’s safety dictate that their decisional autonomy should be respected, these adolescents should
decide whether to take Plan B for themselves whenever possible.
This Part of the article first focuses on the rights of parents versus the rights of their
children to choose to use Plan B. It concludes that, based on the principles of decisional
autonomy and cognitive ability, in the case of Plan B, the rights of the adolescent trump those of
the parents. Part IV-B then discusses some comparative cases of age-based regulation, including
the right to buy and use tobacco products and the contractual doctrine of minority incapacity.
This article hopes to use the similarities and differences between these other age-based
regulations and the OTC Plan B debate to both bolster its central thesis and to suggest that agebased regulations are oversimplifications of more complex issues. This section will then open up
its central thesis to address broader considerations and suggest how the principles of decisional
autonomy and cognitive ability can be a better approach than purely age-based regulations in
various areas.
A. Dealing with the Purported Rights of Parents
Two long-standing presumptions have influenced the jurisprudence surrounding the
balancing of interests between parents and their minor children regarding medical decisionmaking.122 The first presumption is that, unless an exception applies,123 “minors lack the legal
authority to consent to medical treatment on their own.”124 The second presumption holds that
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“parents have a legal entitlement to make medical decisions for the minor child.”125 The validity
of these presumptions are legally true, as they undergird much of the positive law in the United
States surrounding healthcare decisions for and by minors.126 But the medical research
mentioned above127 shows that, with adolescents, the validity of these presumptions in practice
is questionable at best. Furthermore, there is a sort of cognitive dissonance with how the rights
of the parent versus the rights of the child play out in this area.128
The constitutional rights of the parents and those of the adolescent regarding medical
decision-making, especially in the reproductive rights context, are in conflict. Parents possess
the right to direct the upbringing of their children, free from state interference.129 Yet
adolescents also possess a constitutional right to bodily integrity.130 Professor Anne Dailey
eloquently lays out the crux of the dilemma regarding the balance of the rights of the child
against those of the parent:
Any allotment of liberty to the parents necessarily diminishes the liberty of the
child; conversely, any enhancement of the child’s liberty curtails that of the
parents. Unlike the right of individual privacy—which entitles the individual to
rights against the state and over herself—parental rights entitle parents to rights
against the state, but over another person.131
In keeping with the principle of autonomy and the framework of respecting adolescents’
cognitive ability to make healthcare decisions, the adolescent’s right to bodily integrity should
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outweigh the paternalistic rights of parents whenever feasible. This is feasible whenever
adolescents possess the maturity and cognitive ability, from a process-based approach, to make
their own medical decisions.132 Looking toward the future, our laws, especially those
surrounding such personal decisions as whether to take OTC Plan B, should incorporate these
policies.
Refusing to provide Plan B OTC to adolescents under the age of seventeen is implicitly
letting the parent’s interest outweigh that of the adolescent.133 This not only goes against the
constitutional arguments for bodily integrity of adolescents—it also ignores recent developments
in scientific research regarding an adolescent’s cognitive ability to make autonomous healthcare
decisions.134 We should prioritize the bioethical principle of autonomy as much as possible,
especially when dealing with the decision to utilize safe medical treatments like Plan B.135
Furthermore, the fact that the FDA approved Plan B for OTC use by seventeen-year-olds shows
that the FDA believes Plan B to be safe for that demographic, as well as that people of that age
group are able to appropriately decide whether to utilize that treatment.136
Yet Plan B is only available OTC for women 17 and older. Besides de-prioritizing the
principle of autonomy, this policy also undermines confidentiality in the medical context,
another critical element of how people approach healthcare.137 Indeed, adolescents are often
“reluctant to seek certain types of medical treatment if their parents have access to information
132
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about their medical treatment.”138 These types of treatment include abortion, contraception, Plan
B, and other treatments of a delicate and deeply personal nature.139
Ultimately, the young woman facing the need to use Plan B is in the best position to
decide whether to disclose that fact to her parents. If she wants to inform her parents and ask for
help, that is her prerogative, and she is free to do so. The problem is that the adolescent under
age 17 does not have the power to make such a decision, in practice.140 Adolescents should not
have to fear making otherwise legal decisions because those decisions must be channeled
through a parent, who might subject the adolescent to unnecessary contempt, social stigma, or
punishment. Plan B is safe and effective, and adolescents possess the cognitive ability to utilize
a rational decision-making process regarding Plan B.141 Thus, any argument here that the
“parent knows best” fails, and Plan B should be approved OTC for all those adolescents that
possess the cognitive ability to choose whether to take Plan B. Comparative examples in other
contexts can serve to bolster this analysis and its conclusion.
B. Comparative Cases: Smoking and Contracting
America places high value on individual rights and autonomous decision-making, with
the aim of protecting the people from government intrusion.142 Therefore, any regulation, or
“any interference with liberty, is presumptively invalid and must be justified.”143 Such
justifications, from the purview of ethics, almost always rely on one of two ideas: (1) the harm
138
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principle144; and (2) some type of paternalism.145 While both of these theories influence laws
pertaining to adolescents, the driving force justifying such laws is paternalism.146 But the
cognitive development framework espoused by this paper questions such an assumption, and
would actually assert that the “harm principle” is a better rationalization than paternalism for
laws treating adolescents different from adults.147 Two examples of rules that effect adolescents,
and are instructive for the OTC Plan B debates, are the tobacco ban for minors and the
presumption that they lack the capacity to enter contracts. This piece will now examine the
justifications behind such laws, and suggest that how they shed light on the OTC Plan B issue.
i. Smoking
The laws banning tobacco sales to, and advertising geared toward, minors are almost
always justified using a paternalistic framework.148 The framework is as follows: eye-opening
statistics of tobacco-related illness and death are followed by an explanation of the addictive
qualities of nicotine; then come statistics that claim the majority of people have their first
cigarette under age eighteen, followed by the conclusion that preventing tobacco use among
adolescents is critical.149 Underlying that framework is the belief that people ages sixteen and
seventeen are somehow more susceptible to tobacco advertising, as well as more likely to not
understand the consequences of smoking, than those who are eighteen or nineteen years old.150
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Indeed in the most recent wide-sweeping piece of federal tobacco legislation,151 a primary
justification was that “past efforts to restrict advertising and marketing of tobacco products have
failed to adequately curb tobacco use by adolescents.”152
The “harm principle” –based justifications, and all of smoking’s negative externalities,
are only strongly put forward when the smoking laws at issue affect “adults”—implicitly, and
naïvely, non-adults apparently cannot smoke because they cannot buy tobacco products.153 For
example, the harm principle is the primary justification for smoking bans in public places such as
offices, restaurants, and libraries, with the emphasis on the dangers of “second-hand smoke” and
smoking mortality rates.154 And the negative externalities associated with smoking—added
shared costs in the healthcare system, reduced productivity in the workplace—also comport with
the utilitarian idea of the harm principle.155 Yet somehow these “adult” concerns are presented
as only tangentially related to the need to prevent adolescents from beginning to smoke.156
This leaves us in a position where sixteen and seventeen year olds are supposed to be
banned from smoking because they do not know any better, and where the rights of
knowledgeable eighteen and nineteen year olds to smoke can be curtailed a bit because smoking
causes illness and death, and raises social costs. The arbitrary line-drawing in the tobacco
context is further baffling when considering that “on average 443,000 people in the United States
die prematurely each year from exposure to cigarette smoke.”157 Illness and death from smoking
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do not discriminate based on age—whether you start smoking at fifteen or at thirty, you become
susceptible to all of the negative health consequences associated with tobacco use.158
Just as in the healthcare decision-making context and in the law generally, there is a
presumption that adolescents are incapable of making behavioral decisions regarding smoking.159
As mentioned above, these presumptions do not comport with current developmental
psychology, because adolescents as young as fourteen have the same process-based decisional
capacity as adults.160 With smoking, the balancing of individual autonomy against public health
is essentially: someone eighteen and older can choose to smoke, and assumes the risk, but must
do so in a private place, so as not to injure non-smokers; but no one under eighteen may smoke,
because they do not understand the risk.
With Plan B, we can try to do a similar balancing of individual autonomy against public
health, but we have to remove the notion of “risk” because medical research has deemed OTC
Plan B safe for females of all ages.161 Plan B also does not pose a threat of injury to others.162
The only sound reason offered for why those under seventeen should not have OTC access to
Plan B that is not overtly political or religious, is an alleged lack of adequate data supporting its
safety for that demographic.163 Thus, someone seventeen and older can choose to get Plan B
OTC; but no one under seventeen may do so, because there is a lack of data, although the FDA
disagrees, and claims that the data is sound. But as long as that data, insufficient or otherwise, is
out there, and adolescents possess the cognitive ability to make their own healthcare decisions,
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which they do, adolescents can use that data to make their own decision regarding OTC Plan B.
And the line-drawing between the ages of seventeen and sixteen is purely arbitrary in the Plan B
context, just as it is with the presumption that all minors do not possess the capacity to contract.
ii. Contracting
Throughout the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, all minors have long been
regarded as lacking the capacity to contract.164 One eighteenth-century English judge
proclaimed that “miserable must the condition of minors be; excluded from the society and
commerce of the world.”165 The consequence of this bright-line rule is that the contracts of
minors are voidable, by the minors only, for a reasonable time after they reach the age of
eighteen, subject to some exceptions.166 These exceptions, codified in state laws, include
contracts for items that are life necessities, contracts for insurance, and contracts for student
loans, among others.167 The justification behind the legal assumption of incapacity for minors to
contract is that minors “lack the ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of their
acts,” and are susceptible to overreaching and undue influence by adults.168 This doctrine has
often been framed in language comparing minors “to those laboring under mental incapacity,”
but unlike the truly mentally incapacitated, the veil of incapacity is thrown from an adolescent’s
face the moment she turns eighteen.169 This leads to situations where adolescents are licensed to
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drive by the state, but they cannot purchase a car on their own; and if an adolescent did buy a car,
she could void that purchase agreement even after she turned eighteen.170
The problem is that any attempt to determine whether a particular minor, even a
seventeen year old, is competent to contract is conspicuously lacking with this longstanding
bright-line rule.171 This is true even though recent research in developmental psychology
regarding the decision-making ability of adolescents pokes large holes in the minority incapacity
doctrine, making it look more and more like historical anachronism.172 As one scholar put it,
“noticeably absent from the scheme governing rights and obligations of minors in the contract
arena is a recognition of the developmental transition between childhood and adulthood
commonly referred to as adolescence.”173 It is in the recognition of this transition where the
principle of decisional autonomy for adolescents, bound by their cognitive ability, has the
greatest chance to impact these problems in our legal system, by providing a more nuanced
solution.
The common law of contracts, as well as the OTC Plan B debates, present a scenario
where “the threshold capacity issue is either overlooked entirely, or the pendulum of incapacity
capriciously swings to capacity without examination and explication.”174 Indeed in all areas of
the law surrounding adolescence, “incongruity reigns supreme” and the discordant approach is
confusing and bordering irrational.175 Our lawmakers need to realize this and utilize what
developmental psychology and other scientific research tell us about adolescents—that their
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process-based decisional capacity is no different than that of “adults.”176 Respecting the
decisional autonomy of adolescents, who possess the cognitive ability to make decisions whether
to enter into certain contracts and to use Plan B, is a real solution. This approach is empirical,
rational, nuanced, and subject to modification based on new information—in other words, it is
scientific. It ignores political and religious considerations, especially in the case of reproductive
rights, which quickly devolve into a quagmire of bickering.177 And taking a more empirical and
scientific approach to our lawmaking generally is also good public policy.
C. Broader Considerations
This piece’s conclusions regarding the Plan B debate can offer broader instruction—in
our policy-making and legislation we must defer more to the medical community and to the
decisional autonomy of individuals. It is especially important in the context of the laws
governing adolescents, which need a complete overhaul because of “the lack of evidentiary
foundation to sustain presumptive decisional inability” for adolescents.178 The law also treats
adolescents very inconsistently, and justifies these laws and their various exceptions in different
ways, and comes close to incoherence.179 One scholar has argued: “autonomous decisional
ability should be the cornerstone for a coherent legal model governing issues of adolescence.”180
This piece agrees with this notion, and holds that this legal model is especially crucial for the
OTC Plan B issue, and for reproductive rights issues generally.
With complex medical issues that implicate bioethical examination, we should try to use
reason, logic, empiricism, and scientific evidence in crafting legislation. Too often, this
methodology becomes co-opted by the political process, which itself often devolves into a
176

Id.
See Stein, supra note 24.
178
Hartman, supra note 169, at 1268.
179
See Part II, supra notes 57–64 (highlighting the incongruousness of this area of the law).
180
Hartman, supra note 169, at 1270–71.
177

28

partisan screaming match. This political pandering frequently incites visceral and emotional
responses, especially at the fringes of both sides of the political spectrum. And while we want a
robust debate in the “marketplace of ideas,” too often this debate becomes “white noise” and
chills any rational and peaceable solution. Thus, the framework that this piece puts forth to solve
the OTC Plan B debate, a debate which is heavily politicized and painted with religious and
moral strokes, can be applied to other hot button issues subject to rigorous and invective debate.
Deferring to decisional autonomy and to the scientific method, when applicable, will allow
American society and American legislators to come to the best solutions for the various difficult
problems that we face on a daily basis.
CONCLUSION
From the principle of individual autonomy in making medical decisions, this article’s
central thesis is that most adolescent women possess the cognitive and decision-making skills
necessary to decide whether to use Plan B. This piece has argued that Plan B, approved for OTC
use by seventeen-year-old women, should also be approved for OTC use by all adolescent
women of reproductive age who possess the cognitive ability to make the autonomous decision
to take Plan B. The adolescents should decide for themselves whether to take Plan B because
their decision-making faculties and the literature on Plan B’s safety dictate that their decisional
autonomy should be respected above all other considerations. In cases involving reproductive
rights, and in general, our policy-making and legislation must defer more to the medical
community and to the decisional autonomy of the individual to make medical decisions.
The introduction to this piece outlined the political and religious debates surrounding the
OTC Plan B for adolescents issue. While reasonable minds can disagree on a final solution to
this issue, the fact remains that the two sides are arguing about the rights of a third party that
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does not have any say in the matter. It is for precisely this reason that individual autonomy,
wherever possible, should take primacy in our policymaking.
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